Moral economy or moral polity? The political anthropology of Algerian riots by Roberts, Hugh
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
crisis states programme
development research centre
www 
Crisis States Programme 
Working papers series no.1 
English version: 
ISSN 1740-5807 (print) 
ISSN 1740-5815 (on-line) 
Working Paper no.17 
 
 
 
 
MORAL ECONOMY OR MORAL 
POLITY? THE POLITICAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF ALGERIAN RIOTS 
 
 
Hugh Roberts 
Development Research Centre 
LSE 
 
 
 
 
October 2002 
Spanish version: 
ISSN 1740-5823 (print) 
ISSN 1740-5831 (on-line) 
Copyright © Hugh Roberts, 2002 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be 
issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.  
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any part of this Working Paper should be sent to: 
The Editor, Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, DESTIN, LSE, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE. 
 
 1
Crisis States Programme 
 
Moral Economy or Moral Polity?   
The political anthropology of Algerian riots  
Hugh Roberts 
DESTIN, LSE 
 
No one has a key to fit all locks. 
(Maxime Rodinson) 1 
 
 
Argument 
The appalling political breakdown which has occurred in Algeria is almost universally 
identified with the descent into violence since 1992, itself widely attributed, directly or 
indirectly, to the rise of the Islamist movement since 1989. In explicit opposition to this view, 
this paper argues that the breakdown of the Algerian polity occurred well before 1989 and 
consisted essentially in the rupture between the state and the people which took place in the 
1980s and was first made manifest in the dramatic riots of October 1988. The central feature 
of this rupture as popularly experienced has been the problem of what Algerians call ‘la 
hogra’ (al-hagra), the systematic and contemptuous violation of their rights through constant 
abuse of power and arbitrary rule. Popular support for the Islamist movement after 1989 was 
a conjunctural mode of expression of a pre-existing social demand for good government 
which was not itself premised on adherence to contemporary Islamist doctrines, but on values 
rooted in Algeria’s long-standing political traditions. The persistent refusal of the Algerian 
authorities since the 1980s to respect these traditions or to recognise and accommodate this 
demand has ensured that the strategy which the regime has followed in resisting the Islamist 
movement since 1992 has precluded a proper reconstruction of the Algerian polity. 
 
Introduction 
The fact that, fourteen years after the event, there is not one serious scholarly study of the 
October riots is itself symptomatic of the difficulty which the Western social sciences have 
had in making sense of Algerian political history. There is, however, an interesting variation 
within the social sciences in this respect, one which may be observed in the specific case of 
the 1988 riots as in other cases. This is that, while the specialist students of Algeria have 
evinced great reluctance to hazard a fully developed analysis of this event, the authors of 
more general surveys have demonstrated no comparable reluctance to integrate the Algerian 
case into their theoretical generalisations and analytical schemes.  
 
For example, John Walton and David Seddon have not hesitated to include the Algerian case 
in their general category of ‘austerity protests’ which they regard as the characteristic form of 
collective social unrest in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, as of the other 
regions of the ex-colonial world, in the era of structural adjustment and the onset of 
globalisation. Such protests in general, they argue, 
 
                                                 
1 Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (translated by Brian Pearce), London: Allen Lane, 1974, viii. 
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are to be explained largely as a reaction, by those sections of society which feel themselves to 
be adversely and unreasonably affected, to the domestic political and economic changes 
consequent upon the implementation of specific government policies in response to economic 
crisis.2 
 
Moreover, they “have been largely ‘spontaneous’”3 and “may be seen as the vivid 
manifestation of deeper currents of dissent and social unrest which ‘break out’ at a particular 
conjuncture or when a precipitating event occurs.”4 As for the nature of the latter, “in 
virtually all cases, significant increases in the cost of basic goods and services (or the threat 
of these) have preceded and effectively precipitated the outbursts of popular unrest.”5 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that 
 
in many such cases...governments felt obliged to revoke publicly the price increases that, 
despite official denials, so often appear to have been the trigger for protest.6 
 
At no point do Walton and Seddon suggest that the Algerian case may have been an 
exception to the rule in any of these respects (and they explicitly cite it as an illustration of 
the last point). In those passages where they discuss the 1988 riots in relative depth, the only 
unusual aspects of them which they note are “the use of firearms on both sides”7 and the 
brutality of the repression, which they consider extraordinary. 8 
 
When it comes to analysing the behaviour of the protestors in the various ‘austerity riots’ 
under review, Walton and Seddon invoke the work of the American historian Edmund Burke 
III. Central to Burke’s approach is his insistence on the need to distinguish between “Islamic 
movements” and “social movements in Islamic societies”9 if the analyst is not to fall into the 
classic Orientalist mistake of ascribing all such movements to timeless cultural or ideological 
factors. As an alternative to such explanatory strategies, which tend to lock the social and 
political history of countries such as Algeria and Egypt within the mystificatory framework 
of Middle Eastern or Islamic exceptionalism, Burke invokes the work of various historians on 
social movements - and especially urban mass protests - in European history, and suggests 
that the concept of ‘moral economy’ which has informed some of this work can, if handled 
carefully, be employed in explaining social movements in the context of Muslim societies.10  
 
I am in general agreement with the approach of Walton and Seddon to the phenomenon of 
social protest in the era of structural adjustment and with Burke’s approach to the study of 
social movements in Islamic societies. But it cannot be said that these approaches, however 
generally valid, have actually elucidated the political history of Algeria over the critical 
period from October 1988 to June 1990, let alone beyond the latter date.  
 
                                                 
2 John Walton & David Seddon, Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment, Oxford & 
Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994, p.175. 
3 Walton & Seddon (1994), p.173.  
4 Walton & Seddon (1994), p.173.  
5 Walton & Seddon (1994), p.171. 
6 Walton & Seddon (1994), p.205. 
7 Walton & Seddon (1994), p.204. 
8 Walton & Seddon (1994), p.191. 
9 Edmund Burke III, ‘Islam and social movements: methodological reflections’, in Edmund Burke III and Ira M. 
Lapidus (eds.), Islam, Politics and Social Movements, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of 
California Press, 1988, pp.18ff.  
10 Burke (1988), pp.22 & 34 fn 12. 
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This is partly connected to the fact that this history is, in large degree, the history of a very 
complex mutation. This was a mutation of the polity as a whole, but also a set of other 
mutations which followed from this. The most spectacular was the mutation of a social 
movement in a Muslim country - the mass, popular, but distinctly unideological, protests 
which began on October 4, 1988 - into an explicitly Islamic movement with the rise of the 
Islamic Salvation Front (Al-Jebha al-Islamiyya li ‘l-Inqâdh; Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) in 
1989 and its success in establishing itself as the political representative of the urban poor in 
1990 and 1991. To vary our metaphors, we can say that the phenomenon of popular protest in 
Algeria migrated from one of Burke’s two categories to the other in a manner which, very 
understandably, he appears not to have anticipated and which therefore remains to be 
explained in theoretical terms.  
 
But it is also connected to the fact that, pace Walton and Seddon, the October riots occurred 
without the benefit of a precipitating event such as an abrupt and provocative increase in the 
cost of basic goods and services; as William Quandt has remarked, 
 
it is still hard to pinpoint the spark that led to the protests. There was nothing quite so 
dramatic as the bread price increases that had provoked rioting in Cairo in January 1977 and 
in numerous other Middle East capitals in later years.11  
 
Moreover, the riots ended without any explicit concession by the authorities in respect of 
whatever material grievances the rioters may be supposed to have been expressing. 12 Far 
from exemplifying the standard form of austerity protest discussed by Walton and Seddon, 
the Algerian case actually differed very sharply from it. And this in turn is connected with the 
fact that the outlook of the urban poor, who rioted in 1988 and voted FIS in 1990 and 1991, 
was not something which can be illuminated by the concept of a moral economy. 
 
Thompson and the English crowd 
The idea of ‘moral economy’ is borrowed from the work of E.P. Thompson on the social 
history of 18th century England.13 In Thompson’s work it refers to the system of values 
which underlay popular protest, and especially the intermittent collective action of ‘the 
crowd’, in opposition to the unbridled operation of market forces characteristic of the 
emerging political economy of laissez-faire capitalism.  
 
In order to assess the usefulness of this concept for the consideration of Islamic social 
movements - and social movements in Islamic societies - in general, and of such movements 
in Algeria in particular, it is necessary to bear in mind that the hypothesis of a moral economy 
was put forward by Thompson in answer to a particular question, which was in turn derived 
from his findings in respect of a prior question. 
 
Thompson developed his argument in explicit opposition to what he called “the spasmodic 
view of popular history”14 which views social events such as ‘riots’ as “compulsive rather 
                                                 
11 William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism, Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998  
12 This point is discussed in some detail in another paper of mine, currently in preparation. 
13 E.P. Thomp son, ‘The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century’, Past and Present, 
1971, reprinted in E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common, London: Merlin Press, 1991, pp.185-258; all references 
here will be to the latter edition. 
14 Thompson (1991), p.185. 
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than self-conscious or self-activating” and as “simple responses to economic stimuli”.15 
Dismissing, with fine contempt, the “crass economic reductionism” of those historians 
disinclined to take seriously “the complexities of motive, behaviour and function”, 16 he 
insisted on considering the question economic historians igno re, namely, how people respond 
to stimuli: “being hungry..., what do people do? How is their behaviour modified by custom, 
culture and reason?”17 And he found that the English labouring poor responded to hunger or 
the threat of hunger in a very remarkable way. 
 
The behaviour he documented was essentially a series of collective attempts to subject local 
markets in foodstuffs, at least temporarily, to popular political control. Typically, the crowd 
forced farmers withholding grain and other crops, in order to profit from anticipated price 
rises in times of dearth, to bring their goods to market without delay; it prevented farmers 
from exporting their crops to other regions or countries in order to benefit from higher prices 
elsewhere; it set ‘fair’ prices and imposed these prices on traders; and it intimidated millers or 
bakers suspected of adulterating flour or bread, and so forth. These actions, although 
prompted by the stimulus of hunger or dearth, were clearly focussed, purposeful and for the 
most part impressively orderly. The collective force of the crowd was mobilised, but 
remarkably little violence was actually employed; for example, goods when seized were sold 
at the ‘fair’ price and their original owners reimbursed; outright theft of goods was rare. 
Thompson rightly considers this behaviour to have been remarkable and rightly asks what 
accounted for it. 
 
The hypothesis of a ‘moral economy of the crowd’ is his answer to this second question. He 
suggests that this coherent and purposeful collective behaviour was informed by a coherent 
and generally shared vision or idea which both legitimised the resort to coercive direct action 
and defined the limits of legitimacy of this action. This idea was the idea of a moral 
economy, that is, the idea that the operation of the market should be subject to a higher, non-
economic, law or set of norms based on long-established notions of the common weal on the 
one hand and of the traditional rights of the people on the other hand. In its refusal to accept 
that the autonomous movements of supply and demand, the laws of the market left to their 
own devices, should be the supreme arbiter of either the provision or the price of goods, this 
‘moral economy’ was clearly opposed to the ‘political economy’ of the emerging laissez-faire 
capitalism, which recognised no non-economic constraint on the development of the 
economic. The moral economy of the English crowd in the 18th century was thus anti-
capitalist in content but this anti-capitalism was founded on a pre-capitalist vision of society, 
and especially a pre-capitalist conception of the community and its laws as opposed to the 
economy and its laws. 
 
What relevance does Thompson’s argument have for the analysis of contemporary Islamic 
social movements? 
 
Islamic social movements 
To the extent that contemporary Islamist movements are animated by a concern for the 
cohesion of the community of the faithful - the umma - and that they consider this to be 
profoundly menaced by the materialism of contemporary capitalism, and especially the 
tendency of capitalism to reduce everything to a commodity, one might say that there is 
                                                 
15 Thompson (1991), p.185.  
16 Thompson (1991), p.187. 
17 Thompson (1991), p.187. 
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implicit in the social vision of these movements a kind of moral economy. Central to the 
preoccupations of contemporary Islamist movements has been the notion that the Muslim 
world has been lapsing into a new jahiliyya (the condition of pre-Islamic ignorance or 
barbarism), and that the undermining of traditional moral values by Western materialism has 
been a major cause of this decline.  
 
There is, however, a general problem with this way of looking at things, and this is that the 
Islamists do not, as a rule, oppose a pre-capitalist vision to the capitalist vision in the 
economic sphere (other than in respect to the problem of usury, concerning which notions of 
‘Islamic economics’ are not to be taken very seriously), but, if they do so at all, in the cultural 
and political sphere. They do not complain that capitalism is ruining artisans and honest 
traders, but rather that the materialism associated with capitalism is undermining and defiling 
Islamic values. Moreover, their objections to capitalism are rather muted and ambivalent in 
comparison with their previous objections to socialism and communism. While it is certainly 
the case that there have been numerous riots in the Arabo-Muslim world over the last twenty 
years over such issues as food prices (‘bread riots’), and that the rioters have tended to 
require more of the state in the way of interference with the operation of market forces rather 
than less, these riots have not had emphatically Islamist orientations, and the Islamist social 
movements in the countries in question have tended in the opposite direction, opposing state 
intervention and regulation and nationalisation and generally siding with the laws of the 
market against the paternalistic and redistributive impulses of the state.18 
 
In the Algerian case, in so far as the Islamist movement has vehicled a critique of and protest 
against the operation of the Algerian economy, it has not denounced this for being a capitalist 
economy, but - in effect - for not being a capitalist economy. It is precisely because the 
Algerian economy has been embedded in particular political and moral structures that the 
bourgeois constituency of the Islamist movement has been exasperated with it, and has 
demanded its disembedding.19 The principal target of Algerian Islamism has not been the 
uncontrolled behaviour of producers and traders taking advantage of market forces in an 
economic sphere conceived as entirely autonomous - that is, governed by its own laws, the 
laws of the unbridled market, but the uncontrolled behaviour of the state. It is not capitalism 
                                                 
18 Exceptions to this generalisation can of course be found; Joel Beinin has argued persuasively that the notion 
of moral economy can be said to apply, at least in some degree, to the outlook of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt in the mid-1940s, notably when it addressed the issue of unemployment and argued that the Egyptian 
state had a responsibility to find work for the unemployed; see his article ‘Islam, Marxism and the Shubra al-
Khayma textile workers: Muslim Brothers and Communists in the Egyptian trade union movement’, in Burke & 
Lapidus (1988), pp.219ff. The significance of this episode is qualified, however, by the fact that the unemployed 
in question had been induced by the government to abandon their original forms of employment in order to 
work in the war industries, from which they were subsequently laid off; thus the government could be said to 
have had a special obligation to these particular workers, as the Brothers argued; the fact that the Brothers were 
also in competition with the Communists for a working class audience is unlikely to have been absent from the 
considerations underlying their formal position in this matter. There are grounds accordingly for considering 
that this was a special case, rather than evidence of a constant element of the Brothers’ outlook. 
19 Notably in its opposition to state monopolies and, indeed, monopolies of all kinds and the obstacles to free 
competition which these constitute, and its opposition to nepotistic and parasitic practices and the occult 
solidarities which these serve; see the extracts from the ‘Programme Économique du FIS’ published in M. Al-
Ahnaf, Bernard Botiveau & Franck Frégosi, L’Algérie par ses Islamistes Paris: Karthala, 1991, pp.179-187, and 
especially p.183; see also the article by Ali Ibn al-Shukri published in El Munqid no. 28 and reprinted in Al-
Ahnaf et al. (1991), pp.175-178. It should be understood that many of the practices conventionally defined as 
‘corrupt’ by Western observers actually involve the informal honouring by Algerian employees and 
functionaries of sets of obligations - whether to patrons or clients, or to dependents, friends and relations - which 
have moral force in their minds. 
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in Algeria, but the nature and behaviour of the state (and of individual power-holders within 
the state apparatus), which have been the object of Islamist condemnation. Thus, in respect of 
its middle class constituency, from which it draws the greater part of its political leadership 
(its military leadership is perhaps another matter), Algerian Islamism has not conformed to 
the Thompsonian model, but has been in emphatic contrast to it.  
 
If we wish to say that Algerian Islamism has operated with a moral economy in mind, the 
substance of this moral economy is significantly different from what Thompson has 
described. While it has proposed to subject the operation of the market in respect of the 
supply and price of basic consumption goods to a degree of political control, in so far as this 
operation is perverted and falsified by corrupt practices (hoarding and the artificial creation 
of shortages etc.) and the presence of the black economy, all of which it proposes to 
eliminate, it is important not to overstate the significance of this. This proposal has had only a 
secondary status in its project, and has appeared as a sop to the urban poor rather than 
symptomatic of a more radical objection to capitalism as such. The main proposal of Algerian 
Islamism has been rather to maintain and enlarge the sphere of operation of laissez-faire 
capitalism within a framework of law (the Shari’a), while acting in the non-economic sphere 
- cultural and political life - to suppress those cultural and political by-products of capitalist 
political economy that are considered haram, illicit - that is, inimical to or inconsistent with 
Islamic values. This is a very different matter. 
 
This is partly because the elements of the Algerian middle classes which have formed the 
core constituency of the Islamist movement have long been wholly won over - or broken in -
to the economic norms of Western capitalism. In so far as the Algerian Islamist movement, in 
its critique of Western materialism and decadence, expresses the puritan values of an 
important section of the middle class, it does not express a pre-capitalist let alone an anti-
capitalist outlook, it expresses, mutatis mutandis, substantially the same values as were 
universally held in the bourgeoisies of 19th and early 20th century England and America, in 
the era of the triumph of capitalist political economy, before Anglo-Saxon puritanism 
involuted itself into the merely egoistic hedonism of the late 20th and early 21st century 
permissive society in which anything goes if there is a market for it. Thus we may say that 
Algerian Islamism expresses a social vision similar to that of western bourgeois puritanism at 
an early stage in its learning curve, before the onset of unbelief and ennui had forced the 
individualistic impulses of the middle classes of the West to find outlets in patterns of 
ostentatious and hedonistic consumption and consumption-related activities which would 
have astonished as well as outraged previous generations of exemplary English and American 
bourgeois whose puritanism connoted - in addition to the fear of God - self-respect, sobriety, 
thrift and...modesty. 
 
What has this bourgeois Islamic puritanism, with its essentially positive acceptance of 
laissez-faire capitalist political economy and its hostility to the traditional religious beliefs 
and practices (the cult of saints, the ecstatic practices of the turuq), cultural preferences 
(sha’abi music, raï music, theatre, not to mention western cultural imports - pop music, etc.) 
and economic priorities of the mass of the people, got to do with the character and behaviour 
of social movements in Algeria and, in the first instance, with the outlook of the Algerian 
crowd? 
 7
The crowd’s point of view 
Simple food-riots do not exhaust the activities and ideas of the ‘mob’. 
(Eric Hobsbawm)20 
 
The study of the Algerian crowd is in its infancy because the Algerian crowd - like the 
Algerian nation to which it belongs - is in its infancy. There is no comparison with the 
English crowd in the 18th century in this respect. There is no long-established tradition of 
repetitive and comparatively coherent crowd behaviour stretching back over 150 years for the 
social historian to contemplate and decipher in the Algerian case. But what little is known 
from such instances of riotous crowd behaviour in independent Algeria does not support the 
notion that the Algerian crowd has been primarily animated by an implicit moral economy of 
some kind. 
 
In saying this I am conscious that I am, once again, opposing the consensus of western media 
opinion in respect of the massive riots of October 1988, which were almost universally 
described as ‘food riots’ or ‘bread riots’.21 Leaving aside the question of whether there was 
significant political manipulation from above on this occasion, the evidence does not suggest 
that the rioters were seeking to assert a moral economy in opposition to a political economy 
experienced as intolerable to them.  
 
I shall come to this evidence in a moment. Before I do so, however, let me note that the 1988 
riots seems to me to have been different in this respect from the very serious riots which 
occurred in Constantine in November 1986. The latter certainly appear, at least at first glance, 
to have been a response to an economic stimulus of a kind, and to have asserted, at least by 
implication, a right or set of rights that, in the two and half decades since independence, had 
acquired a patina of tradition.  
 
The Constantine protests began in the lycées, where pupils were up in arms about new 
regulations concerning the baccalauréat exams, which introduced new obligatory subjects and 
more generally both shifted the goalposts and raised the cross-bar22 in what was clearly 
                                                 
20 E. J. Hobsbawm, ‘The City Mob’, in  Primitive Rebels, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959, 
revised edition, 1971, p.111. 
21 It would be tedious to document this virtually unanimous media preference for an economic-determinist 
explanation of the riots, the only significant exceptions to which have been elements of the French press, 
notably Libération and Le Monde. The rest of the Western media (both print and broadcast) have relentlessly 
relayed a view of the riots as ‘food riots’ which appears regrettably to have influenced much of the scholarly 
discussion of these events. In addition to Walton & Seddon (1994), authors who have endorsed or accepted this 
view include Daniel Brumberg, ‘Authoritarian legacies and reform strategies in the Arab world’, in Rex Brynen, 
Bahgat Korany & Paul Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and  Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 
1: Theoretical Perspectives,  Boulder, Colorado, & London: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.244; John L. Espositio & 
John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.150 & 154; 
Giacomo Luciani, ‘Rente pétrolière, crise fiscale de l’état’ in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), Démocraties Sans 
Démocrates: politiques d’ouverture dans le monde arabe et islamique, Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1994, p.219; 
Lucille Provost, La Seconde Guerre d’Algérie, Paris: Flammarion, 1996, p.74. A number of Algerian journalists 
and scholars have clearly recognised that the riots were not food riots; see for example Abed Charef, Dossier 
Octobre, Algiers: Laphomic, 1989, pp.105-106; Hocine Benkheira, ‘Un désir d’absolu: les émeutes d’Octobre 
en Algérie’, Peuples Méditerranéens 52-53 (July-December 1990), p.15; more recently, the eminent former 
diplomat, M’Hammed Yazid, who was the director of the government think-tank, the Institut National d’Études 
de Stratégie Globale (INESG), in October 1988, has explicitly denied that the riots were food riots; see his 
interview in El Watan, ‘Les émeutes n’étaient pas celles de la faim’, 5 October 2000. 
22 My metaphor is drawn from Rugby, not Association, football; the new subjects which it was rumoured would 
be introduced, with a definite implication that ideological correctness - in other words, political conformism - 
was to become a precondition of success in the baccalauréat exam, were Islamic Studies and Political Studies; 
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perceived as a deliberate move by the government to make the exam far harder to pass, and 
thus a big step towards a more élitist educational system. 23 The lycée pupils were joined by 
university students protesting about conditions at the university, the inadequate 
accommodation in the student hostels, the especially inadequate transport for students 
between hostels and the main campus, the inadequate food provided in the canteens, and even 
the inadequate teaching provided by some of the academic staff.24 Before long, however, the 
relatively orderly and peaceful demonstrations of these two elements were complicated and 
overtaken by the arrival on the scene of unemployed youths from the shanty-towns taking 
advantage of the situation to make their own point25 and, with the decision of the authorities 
to react with repression, 26 the affair quickly degenerated into a major riot which lasted several 
days and ended with several dead and many injured, as well as hundreds of arrests,27 and 
which quickly prompted a similar riot in Setif.28 
 
One can certainly say that the rioters were protesting against the new direction of government 
economic policy in various respects, and asserting a tacit conception of their rights founded 
on their memory of what the state had undertaken to provide them with - egalitarian access to 
education, proper educational provision and facilities, employment - in a previous period (the 
1960s and 1970s). Thus there is a formal parallel with the English case in Thompson’s 
analysis, in that the moral economy of the English crowd was founded on a tradition which 
was itself based on the behaviour and outlook of the state in an earlier period, the paternalist 
outlook inherited from Tudor times and partly codified in the Book of Orders of 1630.29 
There can be no doubt that a memory of the ‘paternalist’ policies of the Boumediène era in 
particular (based on a social vision that was itself eventually affirmed, if not exactly codified, 
in the National Charter of 1976) underlay in part the outlook of Algerian crowds in the 
1980s.30 
 
But, in so far as the 1986 rioters were animated by a moral economy of some kind, they were 
acting quite independently (and in implicit opposition to the economic outlook) of the 
Islamist movement. And in so far as the urban crowd, after 1988, was harnessed by and 
adhered to the perspectives of the Islamist movement as articulated by the FIS, this was at the 
expense of whatever notions of ‘paternalist’ moral economy had previously mobilised it, 
since, whatever changes the FIS was calling for, a return to the ‘dirigiste’ and ‘paternalist’ 
economic policy of the Boumediène era was not among them and, as we have seen, it 
explicitly supported the policy of radical liberal ‘reform’ in the direction of unbridled 
capitalist economy. 
 
What, then, constituted the basis on which an Islamic movement which was not vehicling a 
moral economy in Thompson’s sense was eventually able to win the massive support of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
see The Guardian , 12 November 1986; Maghreb Arabe Press, 14 November 14 1986; Le Monde, 15, 16 & 17 
November 1986; Associated Press, 17 November 1986. 
23 Le Monde, 11 November 1986; The Guardian, 12 & 18 November 1986. 
24 Reuters, 14 November 1986; Maghreb Arabe Presse, 13-15 November 1986. 
25 Le Monde, 13-17 November 1986. 
26 Le Monde, 16-17 November 1986. 
27 Le Monde, 15-17 November 1986. 
28 Le Monde, 14-15 November 1986; see also El-Hadi Chalabi, L’Algérie, l’État et le Droit, Paris: Arcantère, 
1989, pp.162-164. 
29 Thompson (1991), pp.225-226, 228, 241 & 253. 
30 Section 4 of Chapter 1 of the National Charter was entitled: ‘Satisfaction prioritaire des besoins fondamentaux 
des masses populaires’, in which it is said, notably, “L’État doit créer toutes les conditions pour que chaque 
Algérien puisse satisfaire ses besoins essentiels dans la dignité.” Front de Libération Nationale, Projet de Charte 
Nationale, Algiers, June 1976, page 6. 
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urban crowd which had, at least occasionally, showns signs of being animated by such a 
moral economy? We are addressing an enigma here, and admitting this is the first 
precondition of solving it.  
 
The solution I wish to propose is the hypothesis that the Algerian crowd is not primarily 
animated or informed by a notion of a moral economy so much as by something else. This 
other thing is properly called an idea of a moral polity, and it is what enabled the conjunctural 
combination of Algerian Islamism and Algerian populism to occur in the party-political 
sphere, on certain, extremely limiting and correspondingly significant, conditions. 
 
The moral polity of the Algerian crowd in late 20th century 
In the article in question, Thompson briefly and unaccountably employed the term ‘moral 
polity’ at one point, where he observed, of the theories of Adam Smith et al., that “In the new 
economic theory questions as to the moral polity of marketing do not enter...”31 Nowhere in 
the rest of the article did he explain what he had in mind when using this term. 
 
In suggesting that the Algerian crowd is above all animated by a notion of moral polity, I am 
accepting Thompson’s argument in so far as it affirms that what Algerian rioters have been 
trying to defend and assert is a set of “traditional rights or customs”, 32 “a consistent 
traditional view of social norms and obligations”33 and “definite, and passionately held, 
notions of the common weal...”34 I am denying, however, that these norms, obligations and 
notions are economic in content; I am suggesting that they are political in content. 
 
The riots of October 1988 are the first riots in the history of independent Algeria for which 
we possess some documentation of the rioters’ subjective outlook. According to the French 
press, the main slogans shouted on the first full day of the riots, October 5, were “Levez-
vous, la jeunesse” (“Rise up, Youth”) and “Chadli assassin!”, 35 while some banners 
proclaimed, in ungrammatical French, “On demande nos droits totales”36 and, in Arabic, “We 
are men”.37 There is nothing about the price of bread or couscous here; in so far as the 
content of these slogans can be discerned, it was clearly political rather than economic. This 
is borne out by other evidence. In a fascinating, if tantalisingly brief, article, Naget Khadda 
and Monique Gadant report certain other slogans used by the rioters which took the form of 
rhyming couplets in Algerian colloquial Arabic, and which also expressed unmistakeably 
political preoccupations:  
 
ma bghina la zebda wa la felfel  We don’t want butter or pepper 
lakin bghina zaïm fhel   We want a leader we can respect 
 
Boumedien, ardja’ lina   Boumediène, come back to us 
Hlima wellet tehkoum fina  Halima has come to dominate us 
 
                                                 
31 Thompson (1991), p.202. 
32 Thompson (1991), p.188. 
33 Thompson (1991), p.188. 
34 Thompson (1991), p.188. 
35 Libération, 6 & 8-9 October 1988. 
36 Libération, 8-9 October 1988. 
37 Libération, 8-9 October 1988. It is unclear whether the slogan on the banner in question was in modern 
standard Arabic, in which case it would have read nahnu rejal, or colloquial Algerian Arabic, which would be 
ehnaya rejal; colloquial Arabic is unwritten as a rule. 
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Chadli, barkana min el vis   Chadli, that’s enough vice 
Qoul li weldek ired el devis   Tell your son to return the money38  
 
Khadda and Gadant also provide snapshots of the rioters’ behaviour, which are supplemented 
by Hocine Benkheira in a companion article.39 In the popular neighbourhood of Belcourt, the 
police chief was made to strip to his underwear and sit on a chair in the street while passers-
by were invited to slap him; 40 in the eastern suburb of Bachdjarrah, the police station was set 
on fire;41 in Bab El Oued, policemen were forced to parade while declaiming ana tahan, ana 
beye’ (‘I am a braggart, I am a betrayer’).42  The rioters also staged a kind of impromptu 
street theatre in which police procedures, notably interrogations, were parodied, and the 
Algerian justice system was satirised in mock trials in which the ‘defendants’, accused of 
corruption or other abuses of power, were all acquitted.43 As for the attacks on property, not 
only were these confined to public property44 but, where state shops were the target, the 
rioters were as inclined to express contempt for the consumption goods which they had at 
their mercy as to help themselves to them.45 
 
The cliché of the Western media, that these riots were about food prices, receives no support 
from these actions or the slogans which accompanied them, quite the contrary. But there was 
nothing overtly Islamic about them either. 
 
The riots occurred at a very precise moment, that known in Algeria as ‘la rentrée politique’ - 
the start of a new political term (in the school or university sense of ‘term’) after the summer 
break, and at the beginning of the run-up to the Party Congress at which the Party of the FLN 
was to decide whom to nominate as the Party’s candidate (the only candidate allowed) for the 
Presidency for the next five years. Chadli had already served two five-year terms without 
distinction, and there was considerable opposition in high places to him having a third, and 
support for alternative candidacies. It was at this juncture that the people rioted, and in doing 
so expressed a massive popular hostility to Chadli. Clearly, in the circumstances, the 
hypothesis of a manipulation from on high cannot be ruled out; indeed, I am quite certain that 
such a manipulation was undertaken. But, whether the riots occurred through spontaneous 
combustion, or fires were started at a number strategic points at the same time by secret men 
who knew exactly what they were doing, the point is that the material was there, there was 
                                                 
38 Najet Khadda & Monique Gadant, ‘Mots et choses de la révolte’, Peuples Méditerranéens 52-53 (July-
December 1990), p.20; ‘fhel’ in the second line of the first couplet is normally written fahl in the standard 
transliteration of the Arabic; the reference in the second couplet to Halima is to Chadli’s wife, Halima 
Bourokba, who - in a manner which closely recalled Wassila Bouguiba of Tunisia but which stood in massive 
contrast to Anissa Boumediène - had played a major role in the politics of the presidency or ‘le serail’ (the 
seraglio), as the French press had come to call it by the mid-1980s, actively promoting her favourites and 
intriguing against others. 
39 Benkheira (1990), pp.7-18. 
40 Khadda & Gadant (1990), p.22.  
41 Benkheira (1990), p.10. 
42 Khadda & Gadant (1990), p.22; tahan (which the authors translate into French as vantard) is presumably the 
Algerian colloquial Arabic version of taihân  (proud); beye’ is presumably the colloquial form of bayyâ’, which 
literally means ‘salesman’, ‘dealer’; Khadda and Gadant translate this as donneur which in French slang means 
the person who betrays, informs on; they remark that beye’ also has a homosexual connotation. 
43 Khadda & Gadant (1990), p.22. 
44 Benkheira notes that on the important shopping street Rue Didouche Mourad in downtown Algiers, where 
state shops and agencies were worked over very thoroughly, not one of the numerous private jewelry shops was 
attacked (Benkheira, 1990, p.10) 
45 Thus round cheeses were used as footballs, butter trampled into the ground etc.; see Khadda & Gadant (1990), 
p.24. 
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plenty of dry tinder lying around, and the question of what was in the heads of the rioters 
remains to be addressed. 
 
That there was a substantial degree of nostalgia for the Boumediène era is clear,46 and that the 
Chadli régime - and Chadli’s performance as president in particular - were being measured 
against the yardstick of that era and found wanting, is also clear.47 In order to appreciate the 
full significance of this, however, it is worth comparing the nostalgia of the rioters, that is, the 
particular past or status quo ante they invoked in condemning the present status quo, with 
those explicitly or implicitly favoured by the Islamist movement prior to 1988. 
 
In so far as the Islamist agitation which got under way in the early 1980s had leaders at the 
national level, it was primarily led by two veterans of the earlier Islamic Reform movement 
of the 1930s and 1940s, Shaikh Abdellatif Soltani and Shaikh Ahmed Sahnoun, both of 
whom had been active in Shaikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis’s Association of the Algerian 
Muslim ‘ulama (Association des ‘ulama musulmans algériens, AUMA), whose surviving 
members after independence had been mostly co-opted by the state as the salaried 
functionaries of official Islam. The dissident ‘ulama leaders, Soltani and Sahnoun, were 
bitterly opposed to this co-optation and wanted to reassert the ‘ulama’s autonomy; this 
demand threatened a radical change to the character of the state, the disabling of Algerian 
nationalism’s ambition to subordinate the religious sphere to its state and to nationalist raison 
d’état. In taking this position, Soltani and Sahnoun were reiterating the point of view 
previously expressed in the 1963-1970 period by the small grouping called Al Qiyam (‘The 
Values’), in which they had both been active, seeking autonomy for the ‘ulama from the 
supervision of the FLN-state.  
 
If we take it to its logical extreme, this demand implied the dismantling of the FLN-state. The 
only way in which it could avoid this awkward implication was if it implied, instead, a 
qualitative development of the FLN-state in the direction of political institutionalisation 
through the creation of deliberative institutions within which the ‘ulama would have 
representation as of right, and by means of which representation they could regain a 
collective and relatively autonomous voice while abiding within the (modified) framework of 
the FLN-state. But at no point in the 1960s did Al Qiyam propose this alternative, nor did 
Soltani and Sahnoun do so in the 1980s. They had no clear practical political vision at all and, 
in the circumstances which actually obtained, their agitation, by tending to subvert the FLN-
state by implication, could only facilitate the scenario of a restoration of French power. 
 
The middle class, private sector traders and small entrepreneurs who have formed a core 
constituency of the Islamist movement have also, tacitly, expressed nostalgia for an important 
aspect of the colonial status quo ante, in that their principal grievance against the status quo 
has been their exasperation with state interference and obstruction via endless red tape, 
corrupt officials, arbitrary abuse of power at the expense of their property rights, etc. (This 
tacit nostalgia for the supposed virtues of the colonial régime has not been confined to the 
Islamic- inclined middle class; it has also been characteristic of the francophile wing of the 
middle class, especially - although not only - in Kabylia,48 but expressed since 1989 in anti-
                                                 
46 Khadda & Gadant (1990), p.19. 
47 Khadda & Gadant (1990), p.19-20. 
48 As I discovered for myself during the year I spent in Bouïra in 1973-1974 and during my fieldwork in the 
region 1975 and 1976; Farouk Benatia has suggested that this same nostalgia has characterised the outlook of 
the old Muslim élite of Algiers; see his important study, Alger: Agrégat ou Cité? L’intégration citadine de 1919 
à 1979, Algiers: Société Nationale d’Édition et de Diffusion, 1980, p.161. 
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Islamic, not Islamic, terms.) The urban poor, by contrast, and especially the hittistes 
(unemployed youth), have not shared this nostalgia for the colonial era at all, for the excellent 
reason that they have absolutely no memory of it.  
 
It is essential to bear in mind that the vast majority, between 70 and 90 per cent, of the 
population of Algiers, Oran and the other major cities - and of the urban poor above all - at 
the end of the 1980s were first or at most second generation immigrants from the 
countryside.49 In the case of Algiers, the majority of rural migrants came from the mountain 
districts of the Tell Atlas, and especially from the areas which had been devastated by the 
war, where scores of villages and hundreds of smaller settlements (hamlets and isolated 
homesteads) were destroyed by the French army, the areas in question declared to be zones 
interdites (‘forbidden zones’ - that is, what the American army in Vietnam called ‘free-fire 
zones’) whose populations were forcibly evacuated and provisionally resettled in what were 
euphemistically called ‘regroupment centres’ in the lowlands or near the main roads where 
they could be kept under permanent surveillance and from which they were forbidden to 
return to their homes and fields on pain of being shot on sight.50  
 
The urban poor had no positive memory of the colonial régime. They had a memory of the 
wartime FLN, which was a romantic memory, and a memory of the Boumediène régime, 
which was a wistful memory. In 1988, the slogans of the adolescent rioters expressed this 
nostalgia for the time when Algeria counted for something in the world and when injustice 
and corruption were held in check by a strong and just ruler, zaïm fahl, Houari Boumediène. 
At no point have the Islamist movements before or since 1988 given expression to the 
nostalgia of their mass social base for the Boumediène period. With the FIS, however, the 
Islamist movement gave elaborate and emphatic expression to their nostalgia for the wartime 
FLN, in radical contrast  to the behaviour of Sahnoun and Soltani in the early 1980s. 
 
The nostalgia for Boumediène was not merely nostalgia, since it was linked to a demand for 
the future: if you cannot give us Boumediène back, give us another zaïm fahl. It was on the 
basis of this outlook that many Algerians who voted for the FIS in 1990 and 1991 began to 
warm to Mohammed Boudiaf in 1992 and may ultimately have voted for Liamine Zeroual in 
1995. But the demand for zaïm fahl, while not necessarily merely nostalgic, nevertheless 
translated an unarticulated demand for the return to a status quo ante in a broader sense. This 
status quo ante was something which the urban poor had experienced in the self-governing 
village and tribal communities from which they had come, that is, a moral polity.  
 
The popular demand for a return to a moral polity was not the same yearning as that of 
ideological Islamism for a recreation of the dawla islamiyya which had supposedly existed 
under the Rashidin in 7th century Mecca, it was something else altogether. 
 
Central to this idea of the moral polity were three linked notions. The first of these was the 
demand for the man in charge to be above reproach, honest, impartial, firm, a man of 
integrity respected by all; in this sense, zaïm fahl was a counterpart or sequel to the man who 
                                                 
49 M’Hammed Boukhobza, Octobre ‘88: Évolution ou Rupture? Algiers: Éditions Bouchène, 1991, pp.56-57; 
see also Marc Côte, L’Algérie ou l’Espace Retourné, Paris: Flammarion,1988, pp.257ff, and especially Benatia 
(1980).   
50 Mohamed Teguia, L’Algérie en Guerre, Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1988, pp.257-264; 
Pierre Bourdieu & Abdelmalek Sayad, Le Déracinement: la Crise de l’Agriculture Traditionnelle en Algérie, 
Paris: Éditions de Minuit,1964, pp.47ff.  
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presides the village or tribal council, al-amin (literally: ‘the person in whom trust is placed’). 
The second was the demand for the laws decided on by the deliberative institutions - not to 
mention the leaders - of the community to be observed by the authorities themselves as well 
as enforced by them on the people: Chadli, barkana min el vis! Qouli weldek ired el-devis!51 
The third was the demand for the people to be answered for in the political process by which 
they were governed - Boumedien, ardja’ lina! - for it is an essential characteristic of the 
strong, just, ruler that he does not despise his people but, on the contrary, takes them into 
consideration.  
It was the last demand that was least clearly articulated. No slogans that I know of bear 
witness to it directly in its positive content at least. Its negative content, however, the 
constantly and bitterly reiterated protest against al-hagra52 - the contempt with which the 
regime treated ordinary people, those without piston (‘pull’), without al-maarifa (‘contacts’), 
in short, without representation, and the humiliation which it heaped on them - could not have 
been more explicitly and emphatically expressed.  
 
Thus the subsequent rallying of the people to the FIS expressed an enthusiastic popular 
acceptance of the new party as its interlocutor vis-à-vis ‘le Pouvoir’. The exceptions to this 
proved the unwritten rule in question.  
 
The most obvious exception occurred in Kabylia, where most people preferred their own, 
home-grown, interlocutors, whether those proposed by Saïd Sadi’s Berberist-secularist Rally 
for Culture and Democracy (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie, RCD) or those 
proposed by Hocine Aït Ahmed’s Socialist Forces Front (Front des Forces Socialistes, FFS). 
A more discreet exception occurred in the wilaya of Ghardaia, the capital of the Mzab region 
of the northern Sahara, where the distinctive (Berber but also Ibadi) population of the seven 
cities of the Mzabis voted for their own, independent, favourite son candidates. In all cases, 
popular support for these parties and candidates expressed a negative attitude towards the 
FLN based on the experience of not being answered for by the FLN. And the same logic 
actually explained the resilience of popular support for the FLN in eastern and especially 
south-eastern Algeria, that is, in those regions which had provided a massively 
disproportionate number of the regime’s senior personnel during the 1980s and whose 
populations had accordingly continued to feel, with reason, that they at least were answered 
for by the FLN and taken into consideration by the state.  
 
Thus underlying the demand for a moral polity was, among other things, the demand for an 
egalitarian tradition of political representation to be honoured by the state in its rela tions with 
the people. This tradition was not an urban tradition, it was a rural tradition, and it is still 
alive and well in much of the Algerian countryside. 
 
The rural origins of urban protest in Algeria  
                                                 
51 This alluded to the fact that one of Chadli’s sons was widely rumoured to be implicated in an operation to 
defraud the Banque Extérieure d’Algérie of AD170 million ($30 million) worth of foreign currency; see the 
article by Frédéric Fritscher in Le Monde, October 15, 1988; for details, see Charef (1989), pp.60-61. 
52 This is usually written hogra  in French newspapers and secondary sources; it is not clear that there is any 
warrant for this deformation of the word.  
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A striking feature of the October riots was the ‘vandalism’ which accompanied it, the almost 
systematic destruction of state property in which the rioters engaged.53 In investigating the 
poorer public housing estates in Algiers towards the end of the war of liberation, Pierre 
Bourdieu noted that, on those estates whose Muslim residents had succeeded in securing an 
economic niche for themselves, very little vandalism occurred; it was only on estates whose 
residents had apparently despaired of making it in the city that vandalism was frequent, and, 
significantly, the adolescents who engaged in this incurred little or no disapproval from their 
elders.54 The same investigation led Bourdieu to a second observation: rural migrants who 
were succeeding in their new environment tended to conform to the family model appropriate 
to it, that of the nuclear family of two or at most three generations (parents, children, 
grandparents), whereas the families which had got nowhere evinced a strong tendency to 
encourage their relatives who had stayed in the country to join them in the city.  The logic of 
this was that, having failed to make the transition to the economic and social roles 
characteristic of a modern city, these people tended, as a second-best solution, to reproduce in 
their new environment the social organisation and the concomitant solidarities of the 
environment they had left.55 This ‘ruralisation’ of the poorer quarters of the city went a long 
way. 
 
The new arrivals seek to make work for themselves on the perimeter of the estate, setting up 
small mobile businesses or spreading out their wretched, miscellaneous wares on the ground. 
At the same time, the European-style shops are abandoned. Meeting-places spring up 
spontaneously around the estate. Groups of old men are again to be seen leaning against the 
walls of the building, talking all day, as they did in the shanty-town or in their village in 
Kabylia. But those who turn a modest estate into a shanty town are not obeying a backward-
looking traditionalism. Prevented from adapting, as they wished, to an environment which 
requires a transformation of all their attitudes, deprived of the material conditions for such a 
transformation, they are simply re-creating the previous living conditions which they thought 
they were leaving behind them when they arrived in a modern estate.56 
 
The social change which had occurred between 1960 and 1988 was a quantitative but not a 
qualitative one. Such run-down housing estates cum shanty-towns had proliferated and 
become the norm, and it was no longer the old men alone who propped up the walls, but 
virtually all males aged 15 (or even 12) and over. This ruralisation of the poorer quarters had 
political implications. 
 
 The society of the Algerian countryside, throughout most of Algeria’s history, has for the 
most part been a society of self-governing tribes and villages, in which the vast majority of 
the population has enjoyed political enfranchisement through representation in the village or 
tribal assembly, the jema’a.57 Only a small minority of families, notably the practitioners of 
despised occupations (butchers, grain-measurers) and the descendants of slaves (abid or 
                                                 
53 Charef (1989), pp.84-126; see also Le Monde, 6-10 October 1988; Libération, 7-10 October 1988; Le Figaro, 
6 October 1988; International Herald Tribune, 7 October 1988; Financial Times, 8 & 10 October 1988; 
Guardian, 8 October 1988. 
54 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The disenchantment of the world’, in Pierre Bourdieu, Algeria 1960, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.87, fn 13. 
55 Bourdieu (1979), pp.86-87. 
56 Bourdieu (1979), p.87. 
57 For a fuller discussion of the jema’a in Algeria’s political traditions, see my article, ‘The FLN: French 
conceptions, Algerian realities’, in George Joffé (ed.), North Africa: Nation, State and Region , London: 
Routledge, 1993, pp.111-141 republished with corrections as chapter 2 of my book The Battlefield, Algeria 
19880-2002: studies in a broken polity, London: Verso, 2003. 
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aklan), were denied this representation; another minority, the religious aristocracy constituted 
by maraboutic and sherifian lineages, was also unrepresented in the jema’a, but this is 
because they were, so to speak, above it. Everyone else enjoyed equal political status in the 
sense of possessing the same formal political rights; political influence was not evenly 
distributed, of course, and this inequality was liable to perpetuate itself, but in principle a 
weak family’s political fortunes could improve, as those of a powerful family could decline.  
 
An important aspect of this society has been the demanding ideology embodied in the code of 
honour, which Bourdieu has also admirably described.58 This ideology is demanding because 
it requires everyone (abid or aklan apart) to exhibit a panoply of virtues - dignity, courage, 
truthfulness, courtesy, generosity and wisdom - usually associated with aristocracies alone in 
most other societies, while simultaneously generating and reproducing powerful egalitarian 
impulses. The notion of deference as a general disposition informing social relations has little 
application except in respect of one’s elders and the members of saintly lineages, whereas the 
crucially distinct notion of consideration (al-’anâya) applies all the time. A man (rajul or, in 
Berber, argaz) is a man of honour and entitled to consideration (as his womenfolk are), and 
the consideration owed to the men of honour is indissociably linked to the fact that their 
words count because they are represented in the jema’a, that is to say, enfranchised.  
 
In Kabylia, and no doubt elsewhere in Algeria, the word ‘anâya has the derived meaning of 
protection. 59 The consideration which people enjoy protects them from affronts to their self-
respect, from outrage, insult and shame. The same applies to places: for men to outrage the 
place of assembly, the place of reasonableness and decorum par excellence, by coming to 
blows there is to violate its ‘anâya, the consideration which is its due and by which its dignity 
is normally assured. A stranger to a village will be allowed to enter it only if he is under the 
protection of a villager, whose personal ‘anâya is first and foremost a guarantee to the 
community that his guest will respect its honour. In this way the term has acquired a third 
meaning, that of the given word, the commitment;60 the host commits himself to answer to 
his fellow villagers for the behaviour of his guest, who is thereby sheltered from whatever 
recriminations from other villagers his conduct may provoke.  
 
It would be a great mistake to suppose that these values had become a thing of the past by the 
time Algeria acceded to independence after 132 years of colonialism. I encountered them all 
on a daily basis in the course of my fieldwork in Kabylia in the 1970s. Their survival was 
something of which the state was well aware and which it knew how to turn to its advantage. 
When President Boumediène in 1968 made his first visit  as head of state to Kabylia, where 
his role in suppressing the recent FFS rebellion had left bitter memories, he was publicly 
approached on his arrival at Tizi Ouzou by an ancien moudjahid (former maquisard) who 
placed a burnous on the President shoulders, saying, solemnly and clearly so that all could 
hear, “aqlak dhi l-’anâya ou varnous leqvaïl”: “you are under the protection of the burnous of 
the Kabyles”. 61 In this way the collective honour of the people of Kabylia was publicly 
engaged to ensure that the President’s visit passed off safely and without unpleasant incident, 
as it did.  
 
                                                 
58 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The sense of honour’ in Bourdieu (1979), pp.95-132. 
59 It should be noted that ‘anâya is an Arabic word. 
60 Bourdieu (1979), p.103.  
61 I owe this to local informants in Greater Kabylia. 
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The same values and logic underlay a subsequent but very different incident, when the wali 
(governor) of Greater Kabylia decided to visit the remote village of Tizit in the Illilten tribe 
of the high Jurjura, apparently in order to demonstrate that his writ ran everywhere in his 
wilaya. The men of Tizit took a different view, and not one of them was disposed to extend 
his ‘anâya to the unfortunate wali, who unwisely entered the village without local protection. 
He was immediately seized and bodily expelled from the village by several of Tizit’s citizens, 
who told him: “Toi, tu n’as rien à foutre ici; tu n’as qu’à rentrer chez toi” (“you have no 
business here; you had better just go home”).62 
 
The survival of these values in the mountains of Algeria, and the capacity of village society 
to tell the state where it gets off, is illustrated by another, more recent, incident I heard of in 
the course of my fieldwork in 1983.63  Taqerbouzt is a large village which dominates the Aït 
Kani tribe64 settled on the southern slopes of the Jurjura overlooking the valley of the Oued 
Sahel. After independence it was included in the commune of Chorfa, which takes its name 
from an important maraboutic village at the foot of the mountains, and Taqerbouzt supplied 
the President of the Popular Communal Assembly (Assemblée Populaire Communale, APC) 
– that is, the mayor - of Chorfa from 1967 to 1975.65 But the people of Taqerbouzt would also 
frequent the larger township of Tazmalt, the centre of the commune of the same name 
immediately to the east of Chorfa. By the early 1980s the men of Taqerbouzt had a score to 
settle with the gendarmes of Tazmalt, who for some reason had formed the habit of arresting 
young men from Taqerbouzt on their visits to the Tazmalt market and roughing them up. 
Eventually the gendarmes went too far, and the matter was debated in the jema’a of 
Taqerbouzt and a decision reached. The men of Taqerbouzt got onto their lorries, drove down 
the mountain to Tazmalt, took the gendarmerie by storm and, taking their time about it, 
systematically beat up every gendarme they could get their hands on (taking care, however, 
not to kill anyone or inflict permanent injury). Having ‘administered a correction’ and 
‘washed their honour clean’, they got back onto their lorries and drove home. According to 
my informants, the local senior army officer, having investigated les tenants et les 
aboutissants (the ins and outs) of the affair, decided that the gendarmes had asked for it and 
no action was taken. Thereafter, young men from Taqerbouzt visiting Tazmalt were treated 
with consideration by all and sundry. 
 
That the value of consideration is intimately connected with those of honour and respect, and 
thus the polar opposite of what Algerians mean when complaining of al-hagra, should be 
clear. But it is simultaneously linked to the notion of political representation and 
enfranchisement. To extend one’s ‘anâya is to commit oneself to answering for someone else; 
it is to give one’s word concerning the behaviour of another. It is thus central to the function 
performed by the person who ensures the representation of others in the political organisation 
of a self-governing village or tribe.  
 
                                                 
62 My informants were from the Aït Boudrar tribe but had close connections with Tizit. In a second, somewhat 
fuller, version of this story, I was told that the wali had gone to Tizit to arbitrate a dispute between Tizit and a 
neighbouring village over access to water; the men of Tizit had not sollicited his intervention and, suspecting 
that he would favour their adversaries, refused to accept his arbitration, which is why they sent him packing so 
unceremoniously. 
63 Once again, my informants were from the Aït Boudrar but had connections with several villages on the 
southern side of the Jurjura, including those of the Aït Kani. 
64 This tribe was renamed the ‘douar Aghbalou’ by the French adminis tration. 
65 El Moudjahid, 27 January & 10 February 1967; 16 February 1971.  
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In the villages of Kabylia, every lineage is represented in the village jema’a by one of its 
own, known as the tamen (plural: temman), which is a Berber form of the Arabic word 
dhâmin and literally means the person who vouches for, answers for, guarantees.66 The 
temman are chosen by the man who presides the jema’a, l-amin, and thus are liable to be 
replaced when the amin is replaced. Their role is to answer for their lineages: when the 
jema’a decides to raise a levy to pay for repairs to the mosque, the tamen vouches for his 
lineage’s willingness to pay its share; when the jema’a decides to reinforce the nocturnal 
guard on the village’s gardens against the depredations of wild boars, the tamen guarantees 
that men from his lineage will take their turn; when a member of a lineage is fined for 
transgressing a village by- law, it is his tamen who answers for the offender to the jema’a and 
pays the fine to the village chest. The conception of representation here is quite different from 
that which informs modern Western democracies, since the tamen is appointed (after 
consultation) by the amin rather than elected by his ‘constituents’, but it has the same effects 
of legitimating the decisions of the jema’a and enfranchising the population in general. The 
lineage accepts a decision, even if it dislikes it, because its point of view has been heard and 
its honour both satisfied and engaged; and a member of the lineage, in virtue of the fact that 
his lineage has a tamen in the jema’a and is accordingly answered for whenever any decision 
is taken, has political status as an enfranchised member of the community and is entitled to 
consideration accordingly. 
 
This tradition of political organisation and representation is not a purely Kabyle or Berber 
affair. The jema’a as the principal institution of village and tribal self-government used to be 
found across the Algerian countryside67 and is still to be found in many regions to this day. 
Whatever variations of detail may obtain, the basic logic of the jema’a is undoubtedly the 
same everywhere. Among the Arabic speaking hillsmen of north-eastern Algeria, the word 
tamen (or dhamin) is not used; the man who answers for his lineage is called wajh en-nas 
(‘the face of the people’),68 but his functions and what they presuppose and imply are the 
same. 
 
What qua lifies a man for the role of tamen or wajh en-nas? The overriding principle is that he 
must be able to answer for those he is supposed to represent, that his word is good. This in 
turn presupposes that he is honest, that he possesses good judgement and is able as well as 
disposed to represent the point of view of his lineage accurately, that he is respected in his 
lineage and enjoys its confidence. Only if these conditions are met can he effectively vouch 
for it and guarantee its consent to and acquiescence in the assembly’s decision, so that the 
commitments he enters into in its name will indeed be honoured by it. It follows that the 
amin’s choice of temman is a delicate matter, and that a mistaken choice will provoke a 
                                                 
66 The argument here draws on my earlier article in Joffé (1993) and a full length study of the political history of 
Kabylia which is currently in preparation. 
67 The tradition of the jema’a is briefly noted by Bernard Cubertafond, La République Algérienne Démocratique 
et Populaire, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979, p.188; for an interesting discussion of both officially 
sponsored and unofficial, ‘occult’, jema’at during the colonial period, see Jean-Paul Charnay, La vie musulmane 
en Algérie d’après la jurisprudence de la première moitié du XXe siècle, 2nd edition, Paris: Quadrige/Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1991, pp.226-231; Bourdieu mentions the traditional salience of the jema’a in the 
Nord-Constantinois in Bourdieu & Sayad (1964), pp.131ff; Alain Romey discusses the role of the jema’a among 
an important tribe of long-distance transhumants in southern Algeria in his fine study, Les Saïd Atba de 
N’Goussa: histoire et état actuel de leur nomadisme , Paris: L’Harmattan, 1983, pp.73ff; see also Thierry 
Michalon, Les Collectivités Locales Algériennes d’Hier à Aujourd’hui, doctoral thesis, Université d’Aix-
Marseille III, 1976, t.1, p.40; t.2, pp.548ff, and Khelifa Bouzebra, Culture and Political Mobilization in Algeria, 
PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia, 1982. 
68 I am grateful to Mohammed Harbi for this information (private communication). 
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reaction from the lineage concerned, which is liable to put in question the amin’s judgement 
and his own fitness for his office. 
 
The qualities required for a tamen or wajh en-nas are those of a man of honour. But the 
communities which have traditionally governed themselves through their jema’ât have all 
been communities of Muslims. To be a member of the community of believers was always 
and remains today the precondition of membership of the political community of the Algerian 
village or tribe. And there has therefore always been an important element of interaction, 
interpenetration and identification between the ethics embodied in the traditional code of 
honour and the ethical teachings of Islam, founded on the opposition of Good and Evil and 
the corresponding importance of the distinction between the good man and the bad man, 
insan al-kheir and insan al-shar. 
 
A man of honour, in the fullest and most complete sense, is a good man, a man of good not 
evil, rajul al-kheir, argaz l’aali. The close relationship between the notion of honourability 
and that of goodness is routinely affirmed in the sayings associated with the jema’a. “Sortez 
sur la place, hommes d’honneur; puissiez-vous connaître le bien,” calls Smaïl, the village 
crier summoning the men of Tala to a meeting of the jema’a in Mammeri’s fine novel. 69 And 
in speaking in the assembly, on a matter of litigation between families for example, a man 
may give point to his words and put moral pressure on his hearers by addressing them by the 
phrase: “Peace be upon you, O assembly of good”, Salaamu alaikum, ya jema’at al-kheir. 
We have already seen in the incidents recounted above how, in various ways, the Algerian 
state since independence has been partly disposed and partly obliged to recognise the 
continuing salience of the traditional code of honour, has made use of it, has acknowledged 
its force and, when necessary, accepted its claims. Nowhere has this been of more 
significance than in its approach to the business of political representation. 
 
From 1967 onwards, the state organised elections at regular intervals, to the municipal 
councils known as ‘popular communal assemblies’ (APCs), regional councils, the ‘popular 
wilaya assemblies’ (assemblées populaires de wilaya, APWs) and, from 1977 onwards, the 
Popular National Assembly (Assemblée Populaire Nationale, APN). Although conducted 
within the constraints of the one-party state, these elections offered electors a degree of 
choice: for the APCs and APWs there were invariably twice as many candidates on the party 
list as there were seats to be filled, and the ratio was three to one for the APN elections. Since 
neither ideology not programme differentiated the candidates from one another, what criteria 
were to inform the electors’ choice? The answer supplied by the authorities themselves was: 
‘l’engagement, le compétence et l’intégrité’ (commitment, competence and integrity).70 In 
this way, the state incorporated, reproduced and confirmed the traditional values. 
 
The arrangements made to provide an acceptable element of political representation to the 
Algerian people during the 1960s and 1970s worked reasonably well, at any rate in the 
countryside. By offering a choice of candidates, the Party list ensured that most villages 
would normally have at least one candidate in the running in APC elections, which 
                                                 
69 Mouloud Mammeri, L’Opium et le Baton, Paris: Librairie Plon, 1965, pp.90-91. 
70 Michalon (1976), t. 2, p.347; this injunction remained in force in the 1980s; see the text of the ‘enriched’ (i.e. 
revised and, if anything, diluted) version of La Charte Nationale, Algiers: République Algérienne Démocratique 
et Populaire, Parti du FLN, 1986, pp.102-103. 
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accordingly appeared legitimate to the electorate concerned.71  By the same device, the state 
guaranteed that there would be an element of competition, expressed in the informal 
constitution of rival ‘slates’ or ‘tickets’, which made the elections interesting, because 
specific pledges could be extracted from the candidates.72 The great exception to this rule was 
the big cities and Algiers above all.  
 
In every election and referendum held in Algeria between 1967 and 1987, the lowest turn-out 
was invariably recorded in Algiers.73 The mass of the population took no interest in the 
elections at the local level (APC), and did not bother to vote at this level or any other (APW, 
APN). This had everything to do with their inchoate social condition. In a commune in the 
mountains, it was easy for the electors to decide whom to vote for. They would know some of 
the candidates on the Party list already, and a few conversations with fellow villagers and at 
the local market would be enough to complete this information regarding the remainder. They 
would thus be able to make reasonably informed judgements concerning the personal 
qualities of the candidates. In addition, the voting decisions of the electors would be guided 
by considerations of the general interest of the community to which they belonged: a village 
as a whole would often be persuaded by its leading figures to back one of the informal slates 
rather than the other, because undertakings had been quietly given (if you vote for us and we 
get elected, your village will get a new road, electricity, etc.) and realistic calculations 
made.74 
 
Little or none of this could apply in the poorer quarters of Algiers; the size of the population 
of each municipality, the transient element within it, the low levels of social integration, the 
make-shift character and limited scope of such traditional kinship solidarities as had been 
recreated - all this meant that it was extremely difficult if not impossible for the electors to 
make any kind of informed judgement on the candidates proposed to them, let alone a 
judgement guided by a strong sense of the collective interest, such as might obtain in a 
mountain village and which, by facilitating ‘block voting’, made possible the kind of quid pro 
quo that is an essential part of the relationship between electors and elected in representative 
politics. And whereas rural electors could expect to be able to put pressure on the successful 
APC candidates to deliver on their promises after polling day, the urban poor could not 
realistically expect to exercise any such pressure at all.  
 
And so the urban masses were unable to secure effective intermediaries with the state. They 
did not vote and, being predominantly unemployed or active only in the informal sector of the 
economy, they were also outside the ‘mass organisations’ (workers’ union, traders’ union, 
peasants’ union etc.) supervised by the party which offered some representation to 
occupational categories. And so, lacking effective representation within the state, they were 
accordingly inclined to place all their hopes and trust in the man who alone represented the 
state to them, the President, according to his actions and his personal qualities an importance 
that the rural electorate was never disposed to accord.  
 
                                                 
71 Michalon (1976), t. 2, pp.346ff.; see also Hugh Roberts, Political Development in Algeria: the region of 
Greater Kabylia , D.Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 1980, pp.307ff., and Slimane Bedrani, Les élections 
communales dans la daïra d’Aflou, University of Algiers, Mémoire pour le D.E.S. en Sciences Politiques, 1973.  
72 Roberts (1980), pp.307ff.; Michalon (1976), t. 2, p.353.  
73 Benatia (1980), p.186, fn 75, notes the high abstention rate in the bidonvilles of Algiers but offers no 
explanation for it. 
74 Roberts (1980), pp.307ff.; Michalon (1976), t. 2, p.353. 
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The demand for zaïm fahl had never been a demand of the population of the countryside. The 
term zaïm has no place in the traditional political vocabulary of Kabylia, for example, and an 
obsessive insistence on ‘collective leadership’ and a corresponding hostility to ‘zaïmism’ was 
a major feature of the politics of the wartime FLN.75 ‘Zaïm fahl’ was the entirely novel 
demand of those elements of the rural population who had migrated to the cities and lost in 
the process their capacity to make their words count in the political process, and who had 
come to depend to an extreme and unique degree, for their sense of membership of the 
political community and thus for their self- respect, on the ‘anâya of the ra’îs, the 
consideration he expressed for them, the appropriateness and reliability of the commitments 
he made on their behalf or at least in their name, and the extent to which he answered for 
them in the highest councils of the state. The urban mass could feel represented and 
legitimately governed only in so far as the ra’îs performed the functions of tamen or wajh en-
nas, as well as those of l-amin, the man in whom you can have confidence. When 
Boumediène died, the urban poor lost their tamen, and by 1988 they were acutely aware of 
the fact. 
 
In the traditional political organisation of the Algerian countryside, a lineage which has no 
tamen in the jema’a does not exist. The fortunes of lineages vary over time, and an index of 
their fortunes is their numerical size. A lineage that has dwindled in size will not be able to 
sustain its claim to independent representation indefinitely. Sooner or later it will be forced to 
accept that it is answered for by the tamen of another lineage, which means that, politically 
speaking, it has ceased to exist; in time, it will be assimiliated into the larger lineage on 
which it has come to depend in the political sphere. The processes which have these 
outcomes are ones over which the interested parties have little control; members of an old 
lineage reduced to dependent status will be unable to take pride in their situation, but the 
process which has led to this is not cause for disgrace, and cannot easily be resisted. It is 
another matter entirely when a substantial lineage with no cause to relinquish its claims to 
consideration and representation in the political sphere is denied these.  
 
The logic of the functioning of the jema’a is that each decision reflects the consensus of 
opinion of those present, but that a decision is valid only if all relevant groups are answered 
for by their respective temman at the meeting in question. All groups must thereafter accept 
and abide by the decision if their point of view has been heard and taken into account. But, by 
the same logic, a group which has not been answered for, because its tamen was not present 
at the meeting, will not feel bound by the decision at all (unless the tamen’s absence was 
simply a matter of an individual’s dereliction of duty). And a group whose tamen has not 
been invited to the meeting will feel obliged by the logic of its situation to reject and contest 
the decisions taken, irrespective of the content of these decisions, because to abide by them 
would be to acknowledge the authority of a body which denies to the group in question the 
right to have a say in the decisions it takes; it would therefore be to accept its own 
disfranchisement and its reduction to a dependent status in relation to one or another of the 
groups properly represented within the jema’a. And that would never do: no group possessing 
a respectable number of adult males could honourably resign itself to such a demotion in the 
political system. In other words, respect for the jema’a and its decisions is conditional; and if 
the jema’a does not fulfil its share of the necessary conditions by recognising a given lineage, 
the latter is honour bound to defy the jema’a and treat it with a reciprocal contempt.76  
 
                                                 
75 Roberts (1993). 
76 Roberts (1993). 
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In a state which relentlessly invoked a war fought mainly in the mountains by men and 
women enrolled in a movement whose inner life was thoroughly informed by the political 
traditions of the mountains, but which was unable to integrate the urban poor  - composed 
overwhelmingly of migrants or the children of migrants from those same mountains - into the 
modern economy or accommodate them in the system of representation, and which was no 
longer presided over by a strong man capable of imposing order on the powerful factions 
within the regime and seeing to it that the mass of the people were not forgotten but were 
guaranteed a necessary minimum of social justice, what were the urban poor, whose fathers 
had been men of honour, to do if not either take everything done to them lying down, or riot? 
And what could they do when they rioted except trash - that is, express contempt for, refuse 
to recognise - the institutions and property of the ‘state’ which, possessed by others, refused 
to recognise them?  
The behaviour of the crowd in 18th century England was orderly because its objects were 
economic, not political. The “traditional rights and customs” it was asserting, the “traditional 
view of social norms and obligations” which oriented it, and the “definite, and passionately 
held, notions of the common weal” which it endeavoured to enforce, were all economic in 
content. In the successive feudal and post-feudal forms of the partly aristocratic and partly 
monarchical constitution of the English state, the crowd had never been enfranchised, and in 
the 18th century it was still disinclined to make an issue of its political status; the people had 
no quarrel with their King or his government and no reason to rebel against the state or attack 
its local representatives or institutions.77 Their quarrel was with the local embodiments of the 
new ‘political economy’, and in order to subject the latter to their own point of view, their 
moral economy, they needed to impose their own order on them in the commercial sphere, 
which they could do only by using their collective force in an orderly manner. 
 
The Algerian crowd’s quarrel was with the state, and the substance of the rioters’ grievance 
was not that they wanted an entirely different political order, but that the existing political 
order no longer included or recognised them, no longer respected them nor deserved their 
respect. The crowd had no alternative order to impose in the political sphere or the economic 
sphere, and therefore no practical objective which it required the constructive and therefore 
orderly use of its collective force to attain. It had only its nuisance value with which to make 
its point, and it could only force the authorities to recognise this by acting in a disorderly 
manner. 
 
“Nahnu rejal!” “Nous sommes des hommes!” In the incidents of rural protest recounted 
above, the actors were exclusively men. The same was conspicuously true of the riots of 
October 1988, in which only males - young men and boys - were involved.78 The exclusively 
                                                 
77 Because the moral economy of the crowd involved the selective invocation of the ‘paternalist’ model 
established by the British monarchy itself under Elizabeth I and codified under Charles I, the crowd tended to be 
explicitly royalist, if anything, in its wider political outlook (see Thompson, 1991, p.228), but it was generally 
apolitical. Thompson notes the emergence of a more political rhetoric, including anti-monarchical slogans, in 
the second half of the 18th century but suggests that this was mainly just rhetoric, intended to put the wind up 
the local establishment, rather than indicative of a genuine political purpose; the intensification of this trend 
from around 1800, when the new political economy has explicitly triumphed over the old paternalism at the 
level of national government policy, is clearly another matter, but should be understood, he argues, as evidence 
that “we are coming to the end of one tradition, and the new tradition has scarcely emerged” (Thompson, 1991, 
p.249). 
78 None of the newspaper reports at the time (see footnote 41 above) mention the involvement of any women in 
the riots; the “portrait-robot” (‘identikit-picture’) of a rioter sketched by Abed Charef was that of a young man 
aged between 15 and 20 (Charef, 1989, pp.95-96); recently M’Hammed Yazid remarked that, while watching 
the riots, he had the impression of a repeat of the great demonstrations of December 1961 (sic; he presumably 
meant to say 1960), “avec les femmes en moins” (“with the women left out”); see El Watan, 5 October 2000. 
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masculine character of these incidents is consistent with the thesis that they expressed the 
moral polity of the crowd rather than the moral economy of the crowd. The operation of 
market forces was not at issue. The sharp or inhuman practices of farmers or traders - such as 
housewives might be better able than their husbands to detect79 - were neither here nor there. 
It was le Pouvoir, as-Sulta - the composition, character and behaviour of the government, the 
contempt it displayed for the People and the humiliation it inflicted on the People - which 
was at issue. These affrays were all about politics, and the public conduct of politics in 
Algeria has traditionally been an exclusively male concern. “La djemaa est aux hommes.”80 
 
Conclusion 
In their dealings with the Algerian people, the Algerian authorities are no longer guided by 
this tradition. This departure has a positive aspect, in so far as women have begun to be 
allowed, at least formally, to play a role in political life, as the composition of the 
government appointed last June demonstrates. But the state is yet to repeal or amend the 
notorious 1984 Family Code which made adult women legally dependent upon and junior to 
their male relatives, and it long ago ceased to regard ordinary Algerian adult males as men. 
The concept of rujla – manliness, the quality and status of rejal – and the code of male honour 
continues to inform the outlook of the officer corps of the army, but the latter behaves as if it 
has a national monopoly of rujla, and treats the civilian population as consisting of anything 
but men – as women, children, even animals.81 
 
Contempt, al-hagra, is thus a fundamental premise of the way in which the state-society 
relationship is now managed, or rather mismanaged, by the authorities in contemporary 
Algeria, of the corresponding popular disposition to engage in violent contestation of le 
Pouvoir, and of the degraded condition to which the state has accordingly been reduced. It 
follows that a proper restoration of order to Algerian political life requires the state tacitly to 
take the rioters’ point and work to put an end to the intolerable disorder it has precipitated 
and allowed to endure. It can do so only by replacing this disorder with something which 
embodies the principles of an intelligible and legitimate political order – honest and 
responsible government, the rule of law and effective representation - and so corresponds in 
essential respects to the moral polity which the rioters have been canvassing.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 As Thompson notes of the English crowd in fascinating detail (Thompson, 1991, pp.233ff.) 
80 Mouloud Feraoun, ‘La djemaa des Aït Flane’ in Jours de Kabylie, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1954, p.21. 
81 ‘Quel cheptel!’ – ‘what a herd!’ – was the contemptuous reflection on the civilian wing of the political class 
by Algeria’s former defence minister, retired Major General Khaled Nezzar in a conversation with the Member 
of the European Parliament, Hélène Flautre, according to the French journalist Florence Aubenas, Libération , 3 
July 2002. 
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